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0970-3896 ª 2015 Indian Institute ofAbstract Thediscussion highlights the importance of and the need for a separate debtmanage-
ment office, separate from themonetary authority. The objective of debtmanagement is raising
resources from the market at minimum cost while containing the risks, while that of the mone-
tary authority is to achieve price stability. In the years preceding the financial crisis of 2008, sep-
aration of debt and monetary management was a settled norm and a number of countries with
liberalized financial markets and high levels of government debt sought to adopt professional
debtmanagement techniques to save cost and to provide policy signals to themarket. Separation
of debtmanagement is essential to preserve the integrity and independence of the central bank,
to ensure transparency and accountability, and to improve debt management by entrusting it to
portfolio managers with expertise in modern risk management techniques. In India, debt is
managedby the central and state governments, and theRBI. The separation of debtmanagement
would provide focus to the task of asset-liability management of government liabilities, under-
take risk analysis and also help the government to prioritize public expenditure through higher
awareness of interest costs. The separation would also be helpful for the borrowing programme
which would have to be completed without the support of the regulatory or supervisory author-
ity. This may lead to widening of investor base and market friendly yield curve.
But after the great financial recession of 2008, the issue has re-emerged as in many countries,
especially the advanced economies, the scope of fiscal operationswas expanded, and the debt to
GDP ratios have increased substantially. Similarly, in view of the sensitiveness of the issue, espe-
cially amidst less developed financial markets, there has been some re-thinking on the issue; in
India, the Reserve Bank has also been re-thinking the separation issue and seems reluctant given
the present context of the economy.
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Separation of debt and monetary management 57Introduction
In recent years, after the global crisis (2008), the issue of
separation of monetary management from fiscal and debt
management operations has re-emerged. In many coun-
tries, during the period of crisis, the scope of fiscal oper-
ations was expanded; the debt to GDP ratios also increased
significantly. Consequently debt management encountered
difficulties, and coordination between monetary manage-
ment and debt management assumed greater significance.
Historically, the debt crises of 1982 and the East Asian
financial crisis of 1997 led many countries to assign priority
to public debt management and several countries chose to
separate debt management from monetary management.
As government securities markets became mature and more
sophisticated, a separate institutional structure was
considered to be better suited to achieve an appropriate
balance between monetary policy and debt management
objectives. In normal economic circumstances the central
bank operates at the short end of the market and debt
management at the long end to minimize cost of raising
resources but in times of crisis, the operations can become
blurred. A separation in responsibilities was considered a
better solution that would reduce the risk of policy con-
flicts. Once the financial markets had developed, the role
of the central bank in sustaining the stability of markets
was considered minimal. Therefore, in many of the Orga-
nisation for Economic Co-operation and Development OECD
countries, separation of debt management and monetary
management was undertaken in the 1990s.
The round table discussion follows a brief contextual
introduction to the issue, covering the objectives of debt
management; traditional and post-crisis viewpoints about
separation of debt management; central banks’ indepen-
dence; coordination between debt management, monetary
and fiscal operations; debt management practice in India;
and the role of the Reserve Bank of India (RBI).
Objectives of debt management
The main objective of debt management is to minimize the
cost of borrowings over the medium to long run, consistent
with a prudent degree of risk. To achieve this, promotion
and development of efficient primary and secondary mar-
kets for government securities is an important comple-
mentary objective. Hence, public debt management can be
explained as the process of executing a strategy for man-
aging the government’s debt e to raise the required
amount of borrowings, pursue cost/risk objectives, and also
meet any other goal that the government might have set
(IMF, 2003). This assumes added significance with high fiscal
deficits and government debt.
Separate debt management office e a
traditional view
There was a growing consensus among practitioners until
2008 to treat debt management as a separate policy
1 Operational risk, generally neglected in debt management, pertains
2 In case the two are not separated, then debt management policy even
authorities attempt to use debt instruments to strengthen monetary poinstrument from monetary policy. A number of countries
with liberalized financial markets and high levels of gov-
ernment debt sought to adopt professional debt manage-
ment techniques to save cost and to provide policy signals
to the market (Giovannini, 1997). The benefits of separa-
tion of the two functions were basically conditional upon
the level of financial development as argued by
Blommestein and Turner (2012). The trend started with
New Zealand in the 1980s, with the government recognizing
the need for proper policy assignment and an account-
ability framework for debt management to meet the fiscal
targets set in the Fiscal Responsibility Act. In Europe,
several countries that were heavily indebted in the late
1980s and early 1990s, such as Belgium, France, Ireland and
Portugal, decentralized debt management to varying ex-
tents, in order to reduce the variability of debt service cost
that could jeopardize the targets set by the Growth and
Stabilization Pact. In the UK, debt management re-
sponsibilities were taken away from the Bank of England in
order to remove the perception of conflict of interest in
conducting debt management and monetary operations
(Togo, 2007).
A number of countries have chosen to open a separate
debt management office to have a more focussed debt
management policy in terms of cost of borrowings, market
determined yield curve, and optimal mix of maturity profile
of outstanding loans (Table 1). The location of the debt
management office is important and depends on a number
of considerations. The dispersal of debt management
functions within different layers of government can lead to
lack of coherent debt management policy and overall risk
assessment, and therefore higher operational risk.1 Some
OECD countries have opted for an autonomous debt man-
agement office to improve operational efficiency while
others, seeking a balance between public policy and
financial management, have a separate office but operating
under the Ministry of Finance (MOF). In Denmark, debt
management is undertaken by a privately owned central
bank (OECD, 2002). In the case of developing countries,
Currie, Dethier and Togo (2003) argue that the separate
office can be initially placed under the MOF while Kalderen
(1997) suggests that a separate office may be unsuitable for
overall policy effectiveness of debt management.
On the basis of the experience of OECD countries,
Cassard and Folkerts-Landau (1997) concluded that several
reasons emerge that justify the separation of debt man-
agement e to preserve the integrity and independence of
the central bank, to shield debt management from political
interference, to ensure transparency and accountability,
and to improve debt management by entrusting it to port-
folio managers with expertise in modern risk management
techniques. The separation of debt management and
monetary management positively affects expectations as it
explicitly indicates to the market that monetary policy is
independent of debt management.2
The classic conflict between monetary policy and debt
management policy, and operations relates to the fixation
of interest rates. The interest rates on government secu-
rities are crucial in determining the yield curve and pricesto internal processes, people and systems.
tually becomes subservient to the monetary policy as the monetary
licy signals and to enhance the credibility of the central bank.
Table 1 Location of debt management office in select countries.
Country Location of debt management office Scope of debt management Advisory board
Cash Debt Contingent
1. Australia Separate agency under Treasury since 1999 Yes Yes No Yes
2. Brazil Debt office under Treasury since 1988 Yes Yes No No
3. Colombia Debt office under Treasury since 1991 No Yes Yes Yes
4. Denmark Debt office in central bank Yes Yes Yes No
5. France Separate agency under Treasury since 2001 Yes Yes No Yes
6. Germany Separate agency under Treasury since 2001 Yes Yes No No
7. Ireland Separate agency under Treasury since 1991 Yes Yes No Yes
8. Italy Debt agency under Treasury e 1997 Yes Yes No No
9. Mexico Separate office in Treasury No Yes Yes No
10. New Zealand Separate office under Treasury since 1988 Yes Yes Yes Yes
11. Poland Debt office within Treasury since 1994 No Yes Yes No
12. Portugal Separate debt office under Treasury since 1996 Yes Yes Yes Yes
13. Sweden Separate debt office under Treasury since 1789 No Yes Yes Yes
14. UK Separate debt office under Treasury since 1997 Yes Yes No Yes
15. USA Debt office within Treasury Yes Yes No No
16. South Africa Debt Management Office within Treasury Yes Yes Yes No
Source: Singh (2005).
58 C. Singhof financial assets in the economy. The conflict of debt
management with monetary management arises due to the
choice of keeping debt servicing costs low over the short
term or over the medium-long term. A separation of these
two was expected to avoid such conflicts and improve
policy credibility.
In case the central bank conducts debt management
policy, conflicting situations may emerge. Questions arise
such as whether liquidity should be tightened based on
monetary conditions prevailing in the economy or relaxed
to ensure success of market borrowing programme of the
government? Another area of concern could be interest
rates which are of prime importance to the central bank
and serve as a benchmark in transmission mechanism
through the yield curve. The government would like to
borrow at low costs while the central bank might consider
monetary tightening in the context of financial stability
more important. Further, the central bank may be tempted
to manipulate financial markets to reduce the interest rates
at which government debt is issued (Cassard & Folkerts-
Landau, 1997). In the case of developing countries, where
financial markets are generally underdeveloped there is yet
another concern and that is the limited financing options of
the government and uncertain cash requirements that
constrain independence of the central bank. Taylor (1998)
argues that the accord between the Federal Reserve
(Fed) and the Treasury in 1951 in the US, which emanci-
pated the Fed from assisting the Treasury in borrowings at
low rates of interest, helped the Fed to focus on interest
rates. Even if a separate department within the central
bank conducts debt management, the market will still
perceive that the debt management decisions are influ-
enced by inside information on interest rates policy. In
contrast, a statutory and separate authority for debt
management could facilitate direct reporting to the3 http://www.carnegie-rochester.rochester.edu/nov04-pdfs/gk.pdf.parliament which will prompt better fiscal discipline,
appropriate audit, and financial and management controls.
Central bank independence
The other factor supporting separation of debt from mon-
etary management was the argument in favour of inde-
pendence of the central bank. In the years until 2008,
because of the great moderation and Volcker’s victory over
inflation3 in the 1980s, substantial evidence had been
advanced in theoretical and empirical literature to support
the political and economic independence of the central
bank (Grilli, Masciandaro & Tabellini, 1991a). In support of
central bank independence, Kydland and Prescott (1977),
Barro and Gordon (1983a and 1983b), Burdekin and Laney
(1988), Eschweiler and Bordo (1993) and Grilli,
Masciandaro, and Tabellini (1991b) argue that more inde-
pendent central banks reduce the rate of inflation, while
Alesina and Summers (1993) conclude that such indepen-
dence has no impact on real economic performance.
Wagner (1998) argues that making a central bank inde-
pendent lowers “expectations” pertaining to inflation of
the private sector that determine wage and price con-
tracts, and thereby also the expectations that impact ex-
change rates.
Separate debt management office e post-crisis
view
Following the financial crisis of 2008, there has been a
rethink on the issue of separation of debt management
from monetary management because of the following fac-
tors a) a sharp increase in government deficit and debt,
because of the fiscal stimulus; b) the use of unconventional
Separation of debt and monetary management 59monetary policy in advanced countries involving large scale
purchase of government securities of varying maturities; c)
imposition of new liquidity requirements resulting in higher
demand for government securities; and d) increase in
foreign ownership of government debt.
Thus, the thrust of the recent debate is that under a
difficult macroeconomic situation, the lines between debt
and monetary policy become blurred and hence the two
functions should be brought under the same agency. In the
UK, there is a discussion on this but not in the US where the
two functions were separated in 1951. Goodhart (2012)
argues that under quantitative easing there is a possibility
that the policy of debt management, if separate, can
negate the policy of the central bank, and separation be-
tween debt management and monetary policy is not desired
as the existing arrangements are already under stress. On
the other hand, the Study Group (SG) commissioned by the
Committee on the Global Financial System (2011), observed
that there was little evidence that existing arrangements
for operational independence of sovereign debt manage-
ment and monetary policy have created material problems.
Need for coordination
In each country, the economic situation, including the
state of domestic financial markets and the degree of
central bank independence, would play an important role
in determining the range of activities to be handled by the
debt manager and the level of coordination that is
necessary with monetary management. Monetary policy
and debt management clearly have to be complementary
to each other but debt management should not be
considered a tool of monetary management nor should
monetary policy be considered the objective of debt
management (Bank of England, 1995). In the case of the
Economic and Monetary Union (EMU), monetary policy is
operated by the European Central Bank (ECB) while na-
tional authorities conduct debt management. The sharing
of adequate information between treasuries, national
central banks and the ECB is a norm, and ensures efficient
liquidity management.
In the case of developing countries, coordination be-
tween fiscal, monetary, and debt management functions is
considered even more crucial, where financial markets are
under-developed and forecasts of government revenues
and expenditure are inaccurate. The issuance of govern-
ment securities by a separate debt office needs to be
closely coordinated with the open market operations un-
dertaken by the central bank to ensure appropriate
liquidity conditions in the market.
Therefore, the role of the central bank in public debt
management, though separated, would continue to be
crucial. As an issuing agency of government securities, the
central bank organizes rules and procedures for selling and
delivering securities and for collecting payments for the
government. As a fiscal agent, the central bank makes and
receives payments, including interest payments and
servicing of principal. As adviser to the government and to4 Stockholm Principles (2011) were promulgated by debt managers and c
5 Exceptions are Jammu and Kashmir, and Sikkim.
6 Thorat, Singh and Das (2003).the debt manager, it could provide policy inputs on the
design of the debt programme, mix of debt instruments and
maturity profile of debt stock. These inputs would be useful
in providing stability to the overall debt programme,
facilitating smooth functioning of the market, and
providing a stable environment for the conduct of monetary
policy.
Recent experience shows that there is a need for close
communication and coordination among the relevant
agencies managing monetary policy and debt management,
as stressed by the Study Group commissioned by the
Committee on the Global Financial System (2011), and as is
consistent with the Stockholm Principles (2011).4
Another important change is concurrently occurring in
the monetary policy objectives internationally. While
theoretical arguments can be made to justify recent de-
partures from policy, the reality is that in the post-crisis
world, objectives of the central bank are no longer limited
to price stability. A dilution of central bank independence
has occurred because of the multiple objectives such as
pursuit of GDP growth, job creation, and financial stability.
The need to establish priorities when there are trade-offs
clearly requires political decisions which cannot be made
by unelected officials alone. Moreover, by pushing interest
rates toward zero, the current policy of quantitative easing
has strong, often regressive income effects which cannot be
implemented without political patronage. Hence the
emerging consensus in the post-crisis period is that central
banks’ decision-making should be subject to political con-
trol (Blejer, 2013).
Debt management in India
In India, presently, public debt management is divided
between the central and state governments, and the RBI.
The RBI manages the market borrowing programme of the
central and state governments.5 External debt is managed
directly by the central government. The RBI acts as the
debt manager for marketable internal debt for the central
government as an obligation and for the state governments
by an agreement under the RBI Act, 1934. The RBI decides
the maturity pattern, calendar of borrowings, instrument
design and other related issues in consultation with the
central government (IMF, 2003).6
The most important component of domestic debt is in-
ternal debt (Table 2). The Constitution of India provides for
the option of placing a limit on the internal debt, both at
the centre and the states, but no such limit has been
imposed so far. Internal debt, the most prominent compo-
nent of domestic debt, consists of markets loans, treasury
bills and other bonds issued by the central and state gov-
ernments or all types of borrowings by the government. In
addition to internal debt, the government also raises re-
sources through small savings and contributions to provi-
dent funds. Loans from banking and financial institutions
are mainly raised by the state government. Governments
also raise resources termed as reserve funds and deposits,
which need to be managed.entral bankers from 33 advanced and emerging market economies.
Table 2 Components of domestic debt of the government (As percent to the total).
Year Internal debt Small savings deposits
and provident funds
Reserve funds and deposits
and other accounts
Domestic debt
1980e81 60.6 22.6 16.8 100.0
1990e91 51.3 23.3 25.4 100.0
2000e01 67.4 13.0 19.6 100.0
2010e11 70.7 16.6 12.7 100.0
2011e12 73.5 15.2 11.2 100.0
2012e13 75.9 14.1 10.0 100.0
Source: RBI.
60 C. SinghSince the beginning of planning in India in 1951, the
amount of market loans mobilized annually has been rising
rapidly. While formulating the borrowing programme for
the year, the government and the RBI take into account a
number of considerations such as the central and state
loans maturing for redemption during the year, an estimate
of available resources, and absorptive capacity of the
market. The government also offers a variety of small
savings schemes to meet the varying needs of different
groups of small investors. Statutory rules are framed by the
central government indicating various details including the
rate of interest and the maturity period, with respect to
each scheme. There is however, a lack of comprehensive
analysis of the liabilities of the central and state govern-
ments and their distributional aspects, which impedes
informed decision regarding domestic borrowing.
Role of the RBI
The key role in management of internal debt is played by
the RBI which could conflict with its pursuit of the objec-
tives of monetary policy. The RBI is the regulator and su-
pervisor of the financial system, including banks, and also
of the money, government securities, and foreign exchange
markets. The RBI has to balance the needs of the markets
(manage liquidity), government requirements (short and
long term fiscal requirements), balance sheet of the banks
(asset prices and interest rate movements) and general
price level (growth of money supply).
In the RBI, the Internal Debt Management Department
(IDMD), set up in April 1992, undertakes the function
relating to issuance of government securities, treasury bills
including cash management bills and cash management of
both central and state governments. The RBI as a regulator
and supervisor of the banking sector is able to ensure,
sometimes through moral suasion, that the borrowing pro-
gramme of the government is completed. The IDMD is
organized essentially as a separate debt management office
with the essential units e primary market (borrowing and
cash management of both central and state governments),
policy and research, dealing room, management informa-
tion system and regulation (primary dealers). The actual
receipts of bids and settlement functions are undertaken at
various offices of the RBI especially public debt offices
(PDOs) located across the country. The PDOs of the RBI also
manage registry and depository functions, including the
book entry form of ownership. The Department of Gov-
ernment and Bank Accounts (DGBA) maintains the accountsof both the central and state governments. On external
debt, the Department of External Investment and Opera-
tions (DEIO) in the RBI works as a front office along with the
MOF. The function of cash management of the central and
state governments is also performed by IDMD in coordina-
tion with DGBA in the RBI. The managerial structure of
public debt management is presented in Table 3. On the
issue of other components of internal debt, the government
has a different role. The government announces the inter-
est rate of various financial instruments like small savings
and provident funds. External debt is managed by the
government of India (GOI) in consultation with the RBI.
Interest rates on reserve funds and deposits are again fixed
differently by different governments.
Coordination between RBI, government and
markets
There are various committees in the RBI that coordinate the
activities of debt management with the fiscal authorities.
The Cash and Debt Management Committee, consisting of
officials from the MOF and the RBI meets regularly to
discuss the operational details of market borrowings for the
central government. The issues pertaining to the state
governments are discussed in a semi-annual meeting with
the officials from MOF, DOF and RBI. The Technical Com-
mittee on Money and Government Securities, consisting of
representatives from the market, academia, the govern-
ment, banks, and the RBI meet regularly and advise the RBI
on development and regulation of the government secu-
rities market.
Need for separation of debt management and
monetary management
In India, separation of debt management would provide the
RBI with the necessary independence in monetary man-
agement and create an appropriate environment to pursue
an inflation target, if assigned by the government. The
separation of debt management would provide focus to the
task of asset-liability management of government liabil-
ities, undertake risk analysis and also help the government
to prioritize public expenditure through higher awareness
of interest costs. The separation would also imply that the
borrowing programme would have to be completed without
any support of the regulatory or supervisory authority, and
widening of the investor base. This implicitly would lead to
Table 3 Management of public debt in India.
Major items Appropriated by Managed by Fixation authority for/determination of
Amount Maturity Interest rate
1 2 3 4 5 6
Market loans Centre MOF, RBI MOF MOF, RBI Market
State DOF, RBI MOF DOF, RBI RBI, Market
Market bonds Centre RM, MOF, RBI RM, MOF RM RM, MOF, RBI
State RD, DOF, RBI RD, DOF RD RD
Treasury bills Centre MOF, RBI MOF, RBI MOF, RBI Market
WMA Centre MOF, RBI MOF, RBI MOF, RBI RBI
State DOF, RBI RBI RBI RBI
Loans from Bk & FI State DOF RD RD RD, DOF
Small savings State MOF, DOF MOF, DOF MOF MOF
Provident funds Centre MOL, MOF MOL, MOF MOL MOL
State MOL, DOF DOF MOL MOL
Reserve funds/Deposits Centre RM, MOF RM RM RM
State RD, DOF RD RD RD
External debt Centre MOF, RBI MOF MOF MOF
Contingent liabilities Centre RM, MOF RM RM RM
State RD, DOF RD RD RD
MOF e Ministry of Finance; DOF e Department of Finance; MOL e Ministry of Labour; RM e Respective ministry; RD e Respective
department; Bk e Banks; FI e Financial institutions; WMA e Ways and Means advances.
Source: Author’s compilation.
Separation of debt and monetary management 61a more representative market-determined yield curve
reflecting term structure and liquidity of the outstanding
portfolio. The need for setting up a specialized framework
on public debt management which will take a comprehen-
sive view of the liabilities of the government and establish
the strategy for low-cost financing in the long run has been
advocated by various expert committees since the late
1990s (Table 4).
In India, a watershed moment in the institutional ar-
rangements of debt management was the setting up of the
middle office in the Ministry of Finance in 2008 to formulate
debt management strategy for the central government.
Again, the Union Budget 2011e12 stated that the govern-
ment was in the process of setting up an independent Debt
Management Office (DMO) in the Ministry of Finance. Simi-
larly, the Union Budget for 2012e13 proposed to move the
Public Debt Management Agency Bill in parliament.
However, an important re-think in the whole process was
required because the RBI was not convinced that the sep-
aration would be useful for the financial markets (Khan,
2014). Despite consistency in recommendations of sepa-
rating debt management from monetary management,
there has been hesitancy on part of the RBI and GOI, as
documented in speeches by the top management and ar-
guments offered in the annual reports of the RBI. The main
arguments advanced are that there already is a separate
department within the RBI and that during these critical
economic years, need for coordination would be immense
and that the government may not have the necessary
experience or expertise.7 The Round Table Discussion on Debt Management was held at IIM Banga
and academic in nature. The views expressed by the panellists shou
respective panellists as these were in pursuance of academic argumenSeparation of debt and monetary management
in India: A panel discussion7
Anchor
Charan Singh
Panelists
Harun R Khan
Deputy Governor, Reserve Bank of India
K Kanagasabapathy
Former Director, EPW Research Foundation
R K Patnaik
Professor, SP Jain Institute of Management and
Research, Mumbai
Vijay Singh Chauhan
Director, Ministry of Finance, Government of India
Peeyush Kumar
Director, Ministry of Finance, Budget
Ritvik Pandey
Indian Administrative Service
Benno Ferrarini
Senior Economist, Asian Development Bank
Charan Singh (CS): The central bank’s effective auton-
omy remains somewhat ambiguous till date; hence, it is
possible that the Reserve Bank of India may become
vulnerable to the populist policy measures of the central
government? In that case, meeting policy objectives
including debt management will be practically difficult.
Under such circumstances don’t you think a separate Debt
Management Office (DMO) with autonomous powers would
serve the purpose more effectively?lore in August 2014. The views of the panellists are strictly personal
ld not be construed as those of the affiliated institutions of the
ts in an academic institution.
Table 4 Timeline: separation of debt management.
Year Source Recommendations
1997 Report of the Committee on Capital Account
Convertibility (Chairman: Dr. S.S. Tarapore)
Setting up of an Office of the Public Debt (OPD)
1997 A Working Group on Separation of Debt Management
from Monetary Management (Chairman: M. Narasimham)
Separate Debt Management Office (DMO) as a company
under the Indian Companies Act
2000 The Advisory Group on Transparency in Monetary and
Financial Policies
Independent DMO, in a phased manner
2001 The RBI Annual Report 2000e01 Separate DMO
2001 The Internal Expert Group on the Need for a Middle
Office for Public Debt Management, (Chairman: A.
Virmani)
Establishing an autonomous Public Debt Office
2003 The Fiscal Responsibility and Budget Management
(FRBM) Act
Prohibits the Reserve Bank from participating in the
primary market for central government securities with
effect from April 2006
2004 The Report on the Ministry of Finance for 21st Century
(Chairman: Vijay Kelkar)
National Treasury Management Agency
2006 Fuller Capital Account Convertibility (Chairman: S.S.
Tarapore)
Set up of Office of Public Debt outside RBI
2007 The Union Budget 2007e08 Establishment of a DMO in the government.
2008 The High Level Committee on Financial Sector Reforms
(Chairman: Raghuram Rajan)
Structural change of public debt management, such that
it minimises financial repression and generates a vibrant
bond market. Set up independent DMO
2008 Internal Working Group on Debt Management (Chairman:
Jahangir Aziz)
Establishing a DMO
2009 Committee on Financial Sector Assessment (Chairman:
Rakesh Mohan)
Setting up DMO
2012 Report of the Working Group on Debt Management Office
(Chairman: Govinda Rao)
Independent DMO
2012 The Financial Sector Legislative Reforms Commission
Approach Paper
Separation of debt management with specialized
investment banking capability for public debt
management
2013 The Financial Sector Legislative Reforms Commission
(Chairman: B.N. Srikrishna)
Specialized framework to analyse comprehensive
structure of liabilities of the government, and
strategizing minimal cost techniques for raising and
servicing public debt over the long term within an
acceptable level of risk
Source: Various Reports, GOI and RBI.
62 C. SinghHarun Khan: The public discourse has focussed on three
kinds of conflict in sovereign debt management being done
by the central bank: a) The objective of the RBI as a public
debt manager may conflict with the prevailing monetary
policy stance and the market participants; the central bank
may not be increasing interest rates to keep borrowing
costs low and thereby compromising on inflation manage-
ment; b) The central bank, being also a debt manager,
could take government debt on its balance sheet to ensure
successful government borrowing implying that the gov-
ernment borrowing plan is completed without any shortage
of resources to the government; and c) The imperatives of
the government borrowing programme may influence the
decision of the RBI as regulator of banks, to reduce the
Statutory Liquidity ratio (SLR) requirements. In my view,
the institutional arrangements for debt management must
take into account the country specific context and re-
quirements. To set the context for this debate, we can
examine the conflict of interest argument in the Indiancontext. Even as the government’s borrowings went up both
in absolute and proportional terms, the RBI raised policy
rates several times during the past five years; clearly indi-
cating its commitment to price stability. The FRBM Act,
2003 which precluded the RBI from participating in the
primary auction of government bonds has resolved the
conflict of interest with monetary policy. Monetary signal-
ling in India is now done by the repo rate (policy rate) under
the liquidity adjustment facility (LAF) and not the bond
yields. While theoretical formulations can conjecture con-
flicts of interest, the validity of assumptions need to be
tested by evaluation of experience/performance and on
that count, conflict of interest cannot be established with
regard to the RBI.
K Kanagasabapathy: The RBI is legally not an autonomous
institution. It claims often to enjoy a certain degree of
operational independence in the area of monetary man-
agement. But, in the present arrangement where the RBI
is burdened with the responsibility of internal debt
Separation of debt and monetary management 63management, the RBI’s use of monetary instruments espe-
cially for liquidity management such as cash reserve ratio,
liquidity adjustment facility, and open market operations
can be clouded easily by the compulsion to achieve the
objectives of debt management such as smooth conduct of
the government’s market borrowing programme and keep-
ing the government securities’ yields under check. Other-
wise, how one can explain consistently negative yield of 10
year maturity prevalent in the market in recent times? In
that process, the government securities (G-Sec) yield curve
which is expected to serve as the benchmark for debt and
credit markets in general gets distorted. The interest rate
channel of monetary policy is rendered ineffective. In this
environment, creation of a separate DMO with independent
objectives can definitely help in freeing the RBI from the use
of monetary instruments for debt management and to avoid
mispricing of government securities yields.
Peeyush Kumar: The argument is self-defeating. It must
be appreciated that the debt obligations of the government
flow out of its fiscal operations. There is parliamentary
control on the fiscal policy, which in turn determines the
borrowing obligations of the government. Moreover, under
the FRBM regime, levels of deficit are subject to direct
legislative control. Subject to these parliamentary controls,
debt management is purely an executive function of the
government. There is a little sense in talking of an inde-
pendent debt authority. Presently, debt is managed by the
RBI as an agent of the government. If the government so
chooses, it can take up debt management directly or
through an attached office. In any arrangement, debt
functions will by definition continue to be intimately linked
to fiscal policy of the government. Therefore, it cannot be
argued that independent debt management will better
serve the cause of seclusion from the populist measures of
the government. On the contrary the RBI may be at arm’s
length from the government in this respect as compared to
any other alternative.
R. K. Pattnaik: There has been some debate in the past
on the separation of debt management from the RBI. A
perusal of the debate revealed that in the RBI itself there
were differences of opinion. Nevertheless, the statement
of the then RBI Governor (Dr. Subbarao) against the sepa-
ration was praiseworthy, particularly in the context of the
proposal in the Union Budget 2011e12 to introduce the
Public Debt Management Agency Bill. The MOF of the gov-
ernment of India should consider revisiting the whole issue
in the light of the governor’s public statement and also
Deputy Governor Mr. Khan’s views expressed in this con-
ference as, globally, there is wide recognition that debt
management is no longer a routine exercise. For prudent
fiscal, monetary, and debt management, it is advisable that
debt management should continue with the RBI. The sep-
aration of debt management from the RBI will have an
adverse impact on the market. It is pertinent to note that in
the dynamic environment created by the introduction of
the Liquidity Adjustment Facility (LAF) in 2000 and the
prohibition on RBI’s participation in the primary market
under the FRBM Act, 2003, the primary market interest
rates, which are auction-driven, are no longer viewed as
interest rate signalling by the RBI. Therefore, the conven-
tional argument that there is conflict of interest does not
have much validity. Furthermore, the cost of governmentborrowings is inextricably linked to the level of fiscal deficit
rather than the arrangement for debt management by the
central bank. Evidence suggests that the smooth conduct of
the government’s large borrowing programme has been
facilitated because the RBI, apart from being the banker
and debt manager to the government, also has a broad
range of responsibilities, including regulation and surveil-
lance of financial institutions, financial markets, and mar-
ket infrastructure.
Ritvik Pandey: If it is perceived that the RBI’s autonomy
is at risk due to populist policy measures of the central
government, it is hard to believe that a newly constituted
DMO can maintain its autonomy. Over the years, the RBI has
earned its autonomy and independence in the system and
would be far more capable of handling populist policy
measures than any other body.
CS: What is the right model for a separate DMO? Should
it be with the government, the RBI or an independent debt
management body?
Harun Khan: To put the debate in its historical context,
with regard to the location of sovereign debt management
functions, a multiplicity of arrangements exist around the
world: in the MOF, central bank or autonomous debt man-
agement agency. Cross country experience shows that there
is no international best practice and the adoption of any
particular model could depend on country specific circum-
stances. In the 1990s, several OECD countries entrusted
debt management to separate agencies with the objective
of providing monetary policy independence to central banks
so that they could concentrate on inflation management
and not be impacted by the conflicting objective of raising
debt for the sovereign at low cost. It was also perceived that
independent DMOs would improve operations of debt man-
agement through improved accountability and specializa-
tion. Many developed nations have followed suit.
Vijay Singh Chauhan: Debt management function per-
formed by the RBI is an agent-function performed on behalf
of the GOI as the principal. In fact the GOI pays debt
management fees to the RBI for the same. In such a sce-
nario, the issue also merits consideration from the point of
view of the principal’s freedom to choose the agent.
Peeyush Kumar: I would like to refrain from voicing a
personal opinion in the matter, as I am directly dealing with
the subject in my official capacity. Suffice it to say that the
government has announced its decision to separate debt
functions from the RBI. It is desirable that the government
and the RBI work out the mechanism jointly so as to ensure
that the emerging structure is ably designed.
R. K. Pattnaik: Debt management should be with the
RBI. Independent management and issuance of government
debt could distort the sovereign yield curve in a thin mar-
ket, jeopardizing the monetary signalling and its trans-
mission across the yield curve. In my considered view, a
likely outcome of the separation could be the emergence of
multiple debt management agencies, viz one for the state
governments’ market borrowings and another for the cen-
tral government borrowings. What will happen to the public
debt offices of the RBI? In such a scenario, coordination
among debt managers will be difficult and will eventually
lead to conflict and confusion.
K Kanagasabapathy: In creating a new institution for
public debtmanagement, the complex nature of government
64 C. Singhliabilities has to be prominently kept in mind. First, govern-
ment liabilities include other liabilities besides market debt.
Second, it includes both internal and external borrowings.
Third is the three layers of governmentdcentre, states, and
local bodies. An independentDMOshouldbeable to integrate
all these. Apart from central and state governments, the RBI
is also a stake holder because of the close nexus between
fiscal and monetary management. Therefore, an ideal
structure would be an independent statutory body owned
jointly by central and state governments and the RBI with
arm’s length relationship with all these stakeholders. This
structure can enable a holistic view of public debt, its sus-
tainability and related risks, and also ensure that govern-
ments do not fail to meet the fiscal rules and discipline as
demanded by the fiscal responsibility and budget manage-
ment legislations and related commitments.
CS: Would a separate DMO help in making monetary
policy more independent?
Harun Khan: The process of managing public debt is an
onerous responsibility, with implications for financial sta-
bility in the short to medium term and inter-generational
equity in the long run. Our debt portfolio is reasonably
stable and sustainable and due to our conscious strategy of
elongation of maturity, low level of foreign currency debt,
and large domestic investor base, risks are at a low level.
There is, however, an unfinished agenda of consolidation of
public debt and we are moving towards this goal by active
debt management through re-issuances, buybacks and
switches. More efforts are needed to develop a deep and
liquid G-Sec market that allows the government to borrow
more efficiently, different classes of investors to enter and
exit the market freely, and private sector issuers to price
their offerings transparently. We are, therefore, committed
to improving liquidity. The RBI has discharged its mandate
of managing the public debt in an efficient and effective
manner. There is merit in continuance of the present
institutional arrangement. If at all separation of debt
management from central bank has to be effected, it
should be preceded by a well thought strategy focussing on
perfect co-ordination among the DMO, the MOF and the RBI.
Peeyush Kumar: The idea of separation of debt func-
tions from the central bank emanated because of inherent
conflict of interest between the debt functions and other
obligations especially with the central bank’s role in tar-
getting inflation through interest rates. Internationally also
it is unanimously accepted that there is an inherent conflict
of interest. However, there are differences on how to
resolve this conflict. While some countries have argued for
separation of the two functions, it is also generally agreed
that there has to be close co-ordination between the debt
management, fiscal policy, and the monetary policy;
liquidity management is contingent upon the debt function
and has to be calibrated in tandem. Therefore, by defini-
tion, the debt manager, the government and the RBI need
to work in close co-ordination. It is the institutional
arrangement required for this harmonization that is under
discussion. Under the existing scheme, RBI manages the
debt functions and liquidity internally, with effective syn-
chronization by the government of the former. Once the
debt function is segregated from RBI, the policies will have
to be synchronized between the Government, central bank
and the debt manager effectively.R. K. Pattnaik: Not necessarily. The RBI has been suc-
cessfully managing the government borrowing programme
with its knowledge and experience in studying market
liquidity, investors’ appetite and risk constraints, apart
from timing of debt issuance in line with its avowed
objective of maintaining financial stability. There has not
been any empirical research to prove that the monetary
policy function has been adversely affected because the
RBI is the debt manager. Furthermore, evidence suggests
that the cash management of the government has remained
poor and inefficient. The RBI, as banker and debt manager,
has been helpful in accommodating the deficit and surplus
mode, taking into account the absorptive capacity of the
market. One doubts if an independent body will have the
experience to handle cash management of such magnitude
and varying degree. In the post-crisis environment globally,
there has been a renewed focus on debt management as
being a critical element in the overall conduct for financial
stability, as events in Greece have shown. Studies under-
taken by multilateral agencies such as the World Bank, In-
ternational Monetary Fund (IMF) and Bank for International
Settlements (BIS) observe that there is merit in leaving debt
management with central banks. The BIS study (November
2010) particularly noted that debt management can no
longer be viewed as a routine function that can be dele-
gated to a separate, independent body. Instead, such
management lies at the crossroads between monetary and
fiscal policy. The study further opined that during difficult
times, government securities market conditions are better
managed by the central banks. In view of this, the study
recommended that the central banks should be encouraged
to revert to their role of managing national debt. The
recent handling of the market borrowing programme by the
RBI in a non-disruptive manner in its capacity as debt
manager and monetary authority clearly indicates that
there exists a strong confluence of interest in debt and
monetary management, contrary to the conventional view
that there is a conflict of interest. In view of the above
factors, it is imperative that debt management continues
with the RBI. The Middle Office that has been set up within
the MOF may be further strengthened to coordinate and
provide technical and analytical input to the cash and debt
management committee. The GOI may reconsider the
introduction of the bill on Public Debt Management Agency
with an emphasis on separation of debt management from
the RBI.
K Kanagasabapathy: Operational independence in
monetary policy would require some legislative changes.
Even in the absence of that, separation of debt manage-
ment can help making monetary policy more independent
than what it is today.
CS: In the current economic situation, when debt to GDP
ratio has been declining, would separating debt from
monetary management be useful for India?
Harun Khan: A point that merits attention is that the
proponents of separation, while citing examples from
countries which differ significantly with regard to institu-
tional milieu from India, pay little attention to nuances of
debt management operations. For instance, domestic debt
in the UK is managed by the DMO, whereas external debt is
the responsibility of the Bank of England. The whole concept
of an “all-in-one debt office” is a theoretical construct
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that sovereign debt management (SDM) is much more than a
mere resource raising exercise especially in a developing
country context like ours. The size and dynamics of gov-
ernment market borrowing has a much wider influence on
interest rate movements and systemic liquidity. An auton-
omous DMO, driven by specific objectives exclusively
focussing on debt management, may not be able to manage
this complex task involving various trade-offs. With regard
to autonomous DMOs focussing on specific responsibilities,
the experience of European debt managers is instructive.
The experience of the DMO in the Euro area (especially
Greece, Portugal and Ireland) has been less than satisfac-
tory. The independent DMOs seemed to have been guided by
perverse incentives and issued short-term/foreign debt in a
disproportionate fashion, intensifying roll-over risk, sover-
eign risk and financial instability. The debt management
strategy and operations have resulted in a skewed maturity
profile with balloon payments. For instance, Greece has
bunched maturities during 2010e19 with interest payments
on public debt constituting nearly 40% of Greece’s budget
deficit during 2009. Large proportion (above 70%) of debt of
Portugal, Greece and Ireland was held by non-residents. As
foreign investors turned risk averse and started withdrawing
investments, rating agencies downgraded the debt of these
countries. The debt management strategy has jeopardized
the fiscal situation and financial stability. Therefore, an
autonomous DMO focussing on specific objectives, such as
cost minimisation in isolation and not in conjunction with
other macro-economic policies may result in sub-optimal
debt management outcomes. Persistent fiscal deficit war-
ranting huge borrowings, often at the cost of flow of reserves
to the private sector, has been the predominant feature of
the Indian economy. Increasing borrowings by the govern-
ment, the central and the state governments, have to be
strategically planned and tactically executed keeping in
view the market conditions, liquidity situation, and macro-
economic implications. Thus, given the persistently large
size of the market borrowings, there is a strong case for
confluence of interest between monetary policy and debt
management in India. In a situation of excess capital flows
requiring forex intervention from the RBI and the conse-
quent sterilization through issuance of government secu-
rities under the Market Stabilisation Scheme (MSS), the
coordination of debt management with these operations
needs to continue. Separation of debtmanagement from the
RBI will make it very difficult to harmonize these operations
as is done at present.
In India, the genesis of the proposal could be traced back
to various committees/working groups, such as Committee
on Capital Account Convertibility (1997); Review Group of
Standing Committee on International Financial Standards &
Codes (2004), Percy Mistry Committee (2007), Internal
Working Group on Debt Management, MOF (2008), and
finally Financial Sector Legislative Reforms Committee
(2013), which suggested separation of debt management
from monetary management. During this phase the RBI,
while suggesting separation, has made it conditional on
attainment of three milestones: development of the G-Sec
market, durable fiscal correction, and an enabling legisla-
tive framework. It is argued that a separate DMO will help
establish transparency, and assign specific responsibilityand accountability on the debt manager and could lead to
an integrated and more professional management of all
government liabilities, with a focussed mandate. The sig-
nificant impact of government borrowing on the broader
interest rate structure in the economy and, therefore, on
the monetary transmission process in financial markets,
makes it a critical component of the macroeconomic
management framework. In such a scenario, central bank
involvement in managing the market volatility and market
expectations arising out of government debt borrowing
becomes necessary. Past experience, reinforced by the
recent developments regarding huge market borrowing of
the government, has shown the necessity of this approach.
Such will be the case even if the central bank is dis-
associated from the operational aspects of debt issuance.
This being so, it is better for the central bank to have
hands-on involvement. It is, therefore, imperative that
future course of action needs to be decided based on
ground realities of our country rather than from an ideo-
logical perspective emerging from post-crisis international
experience and the fact that the separation of debt man-
agement from the central bank could compromise the
effectiveness of monetary policy, efficiency of debt man-
agement, and stability of financial markets. Therefore,
there is a strong case for continuance of present system of
central bank managing debt management in India. In case,
however, a decision is taken to move the debt management
function to a separate unit, it needs to be preceded by well
thought out strategy on timing of commencement of its
operations, selection of personnel, their incentive struc-
ture, performance evaluation benchmarks from the long
term debt sustainability points of view and arrangements
for perfect institutional and operational co-ordination
among the debt management unit, the MOF and the RBI.
Peeyush Kumar: There is no good time for separation of
debt functions. Of course, the RBI has raised the issue of
high levels of debt and prevailing macro-economic condi-
tions to argue for deferring the segregation of the debt
function to a more opportune time, but the merit of this
argument is debatable. It is a fact that high levels of gov-
ernment borrowings require active liquidity management
by the bank. Since the central bank does not issue its own
securities, it may require using government borrowing for
market interventions under special circumstances. This
brings back the argument that there has to be close and
effective coordination between the debt operations and
market operations. An independent debt manager leads to
another layer in this coordination matrix and may lead to
difficulty if this is not managed with dexterity. But that is
an argument for better institutional arrangement; the
timing of this arrangement is not the issue, It would be
critical to design appropriate institutional mechanisms at
whatever juncture it is attempted.
R. K. Pattnaik: The Indian economy in the post-crisis
period has been characterized by deceleration in growth
and persistent inflation. Themain contributing factor to such
economicmalaise is poor fiscal management. Even under the
given FRBM Act, the Indian authorities were unsuccessful in
adhering to the golden rule of government finance, that is,
the elimination of revenue deficit. Thus, the borrowings by
the government are pre-empted for meeting current con-
sumption expenditure. The continuation of revenue deficit
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government. Furthermore, this has led to a lower provision
for capital outlay. Inflation management is difficult as the
expenditure pattern of the government fuelled the demand
side, thereby making monetary policy ineffective. It has also
constrained the scope of fiscal space.
As long as revenue deficit remains in the fiscal sector the
threat to fiscal deficit and debt continues. One wonders
whether the GOI, which has failed to put in place an
effective and efficient cash management system, can
handle debt management with a separate debt manage-
ment office. The RBI is right in its recent assertion that the
separation of debt management from RBI is a sub optimal
choice. In the same spirit one could also argue that fixation
of ways and means advances (WMA) limits with mutual
agreement, which has largely remained arbitrary, is also a
sub-optimal choice. It is important to note that poor cash
management practice not only wastes money, but also in-
hibits the development of local financial markets and un-
dermines the effectiveness of monetary policy. First, the
limits could be formula-based as it is for the state govern-
ments. Second, in order to even out bunching of receipts
from advance income tax payments, a monthly basis system
could be considered against the present system of quarterly
basis. Third, the receipts given to state governments in
terms of grants and tax could be reworked taking into ac-
count the cash flows. Fourth, since consolidated sinking
fund has not been put in place so far for the GOI, it may be
considered, to take care of the repayment system. Fifth,
the calendar for market borrowings and treasury bills to a
large extent takes care of repayments but it could be re-
examined taking into account the cash flow statement. For
this to be effective, all the agents have to be pro-active,
not leaving the management to the RBI. Sixth, the approach
so far has been to treat cash management of GOI and state
governments separately. It is appropriate to put in place a
comprehensive approach. Seventh, it would be advisable to
have an expert committee to review the current arrange-
ments for WMA/overdraft/surplus and prescribe the limits
and other related arrangements.
CS: How do you explain the difference in the fiscal
deficit and borrowing requirement of the central govern-
ment observed in many of the years?
Vijay Singh Chauhan: In theory, the fiscal deficit of the
government will equal the net borrowing (i.e. net of
repayment), adjusted for the changes in the cash balances.
In the case of GOI, the position is rather complicated. Firstly,
central government has a single cash balance account
covering the consolidated fund, the public account, and the
contingency fund. As you know, fiscal deficit relates only to
transactions covered by consolidated fund. Therefore, sur-
pluses in public account reduce the market borrowing
requirement. Secondly, the cash balance account of all the
state governments and the central government is linked
through the mechanism of ad hoc treasury bills. Put simply,
cash balance surpluses of state governments get transferred
as borrowing to central government. Since, state govern-
ments have been running cash surplus for many years now,
the market borrowing requirement of central government
can be reduced to that extent. Thirdly, there exists the
mechanism of Market Stabilization Scheme (MSS) which
provides for GOI borrowing in excess of its requirement, atthe request of RBI for sterilization purposes. Since borrowed
funds are not available for spending and are sequestered, it
does not impact fiscal deficit.
CS: In the pre-crisis period a dominant view was
emerging that cash, debt, and liquidity management
should be segregated. What are the reasons after the
global financial meltdown that led to a predominant shift
in that view? What according to you would be the correct
approach for India to follow?
Harun Khan: In the pre-crisis phase, the functions of
monetary policy, financial stability and sovereign debt
management (SDM) used to be looked upon as an “impos-
sible trinity”. Post-crisis, their interdependence is
increasingly being recognized. Unlike in the past, central
banks’ operations are not currently confined to the shorter
end but are carried out across the yield curve. Similarly,
government debt managers, opportunistically or under
compulsion, are increasingly operating at the shorter end.
This has intensified the interaction between monetary
policy and SDM, warranting greater coordination in the in-
terest of policy credibility and financial stability. Interna-
tionally, there has been a rethinking on the issue of debt
management by central banks, with scholars like Charles
Goodhart articulating that debt management being a crit-
ical element in the overall conduct of macroeconomic
policy, central banks should be encouraged to revert to
their role of managing the national debt. In this context,
the cause of coordination is always better served under the
same roof than by a separation from the central bank,
accompanied by a closer inter-institutional coordination.
There could be an argument that coordination mechanism
could be designed between the central bank and the DMO
either by statute or executive order. The experience of
coordination mechanisms between the DMO and the central
bank, which are vital for economic management, is how-
ever, far from satisfactory and has impacted debt man-
agement. There have been instances of failed auctions, in
the UK (March 2009) for instance, causing reputation risk
for both the authorities. Against this backdrop, it is strongly
felt that given the large size of the market borrowings,
there is a confluence of interest between monetary policy
and debt management in India.
K Kanagasabapathy: Cash and debt management func-
tions are inseparable by definition since it is the need for
cash that necessitates borrowings. Also the situation of
cash surplus needs to be handled in an integrated manner.
Liquidity management is essentially a monetary operation.
The liquidity management by the central bank should
ensure that the quantum channel of monetary policy
operating through its liquidity management is consistent
with its tight or easy policy stance. For instance when a
tight monetary policy stance is taken it is necessary that
the liquidity is also kept tight in the system. If enormous
liquidity is provided when the policy stance is tight, it will
not ensure effective operation of the interest rate channel.
When cash and debt management is combined with
liquidity management, then the liquidity management can
be clouded by the objectives of debt management. This is
one reason why the G-Sec yields get mispriced contrary to
monetary policy stance. While liquidity management is to
be independent of cash and debt management, it is still
necessary that the monetary authority is kept informed of
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agency’s actions since the total liquidity in the system is
influenced by movements in cash balances of governments
and also primary issuances of government debt. This in-
formation sharing will ensure smooth operation of liquidity
management consistent with monetary policy stance.
Peeyush Kumar: The US Fed policy of quantitative
easing was to a great extent responsible for the bubble that
was created in years preceding global financial crisis (GFC).
The 2008 crisis was also the result of reckless debt practices
adopted by some countries, especially in the European
Union. Thus analysis of the financial crisis faced at the
global level led to the growing sense that the cash, debt
and liquidity management functions must be discharged in
tandem by the central banks. It was in some way a reversal
of the earlier stance of segregation of these functions, and
there was general consensus that there had to effective
dovetailing of these policies even when they were being
performed separately. India has had a record of prudent
financial systems which was demonstrated by the fact that
GFC did not have any direct impact on Indian financial
markets. There can be no denying the fact that debt policy
and liquidity management functions are intertwined and
even if they are to be segregated there will be need for
synergy in policy. Much depends on the institutional
arrangement and its functioning.
R. K. Pattnaik: A very careful decision needs to be
taken. One has to note that cash, debt, and liquidity
management are public goods. The persistence of large
surplus in recent times by the government with the RBI has
adverse implications for fiscal policy, monetary and
liquidity management, and domestic public debt manage-
ment. Unlike the cash deficit management, the cash surplus
management has not received adequate public attention.
This could be because in public policy it is apparently
assumed that the emergence of surplus is “good” and
deficit is “bad”. The persistence of cash surplus also makes
debt management difficult. In recent times, there were
instances of cancellation of auction of dated securities and
treasury bills implying that the calendar of issues becomes
redundant and there is a stress on price discovery process in
subsequent auctions. We have a Cash and Debt Manage-
ment Committee which is an excellent institutional
arrangement with representatives from the RBI and the
government. Further strengthening of this institutional
mechanism could be a better option than separation of
functions. A few policy options for the consideration of the
committee are in order.
First, introduction of an ex ante cash flow statement on
a daily basis to analyze the cyclical and structural factors.
Second, elimination of structural factors contributing to
cash surplus and fixing a limit of surplus for the government
in the same manner as WMA.
Third, transferring the investment in 14-day intermedi-
ate treasury bills with immediate effect to ‘consolidated
sinking fund’ investment to address the humps in debt
repayment in the immediate future. Fourth, advance tax
collection on a monthly basis in place of a quarterly basis.
Fifth, in order to ensure transparency, the central govern-
ment and the RBI may consider disseminating data to the
public on the modalities of surplus investment, which in-
cludes the volume, rate of interest, and maturity. Sixth,one option which needs serious consideration of the au-
thorities is the investment of government surplus in the
market through an auction system.
CS: What are your views on debt sustainability? Is there
an internationally accepted benchmark for assessing the
sustainability of domestic debt? If not, what is the under-
lying mechanism adopted by the GOI to identify the
threshold range of sustainable debt?
Benno Ferrarini: International bodies, such as the IMF,
have adopted a debt ratio of 40% to GDP as a rule-of-thumb
benchmark for emerging markets. Unfortunately, it is far
from straightforward to establish a relevant benchmark, or
debt limit, that distinguishes a safe debt ratio from a per-
ilous one. Such a benchmark should reflect a country’s debt
tolerance, that is its capacity to successfully manage fiscal
policy as debt rises. But debt tolerance depends on a wide
range of country specific factors, including debt structure,
hidden liabilities, economic volatility, institutional quality,
adjustment record, and default history that are difficult to
translate into a benchmark. In the case of India, the
benchmark is likely much higher than 40% to GDP. The
country’s share of external debt is small, which limits
exposure to foreign sentiment and discipline about debt
sustainability. Moreover, debt financing and management in
India is greatly facilitated by the fact that the public sector
itself, through shares in banks and insurance companies,
holds a significant share of GOI securities. Finally, nearly all
of the government debt is in fixed interest loans and the
average residual maturity of the central government debt is
relatively long by international standards, so the refinanc-
ing risk is low. Notwithstanding these considerations, there
is no room for complacency and the public debt ratio must
be held closely in check. The global financial crisis in 2008
and a marked slowdown of GDP growth more recently un-
derscore the need for continuing policy focus to ensure
fiscal sustainability and financial stability, and for further
action towards strengthening the practices India employs in
managing its public debt.
Peeyush Kumar: There are no internationally accepted
benchmarks for sustainable levels of debt. Some advanced
economies have very high levels of debt without any major
macro-economic instability; while a few countries with
relatively lower levels of debt have faced serious crisis.
Interestingly, emerging economies generally have more
stable debt levels. Debt sustainability has to be viewed in
the specific macro-economic framework of the country;
pertinently in the context of debt profile, external risk,
financial systems etc. In the Indian context, where debt is
predominantly exchange-rate shock free and domestically
held in fixed tenor instruments, level of debt is not an
overwhelming concern. Of more immediate concern is the
increasing size of gross borrowing especially with roll-over
raising the gross borrowing. With increase in government
borrowing, crowding out of private investment has a dele-
terious impact on the growth cycle. The government has,
under the new FRBM regime, limited its borrowing levels to
provide impetus to private investment and revival of
growth cycle.
R. K. Pattnaik: Our empirical exercise reveals that the
tax buoyancy for the centre is around 1.35 and the total
revenue buoyancy is 1.17, whereas the expenditure elas-
ticity is 1.22. This indicates that an elimination of revenue
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ancy is further increased with emphasis on minimizing the
structural component. In non-interest revenue expendi-
ture, the structural component predominates. However,
the share of development expenditure in this category is
lower than the non-development components. The persis-
tence of revenue deficit accentuates the vicious cycle of
deficit and debt. The current debt to GDP ratio at around
50% for India seems to be lower than the European econo-
mies, the US and Japan. However, a sheer low number is
meaningless until the sustainability factor is suitably
addressed by elimination of revenue deficit. In a federal
set-up like India, the analysis of fiscal sustainability is
incomplete without addressing underlying issues in state
finances. Evidence suggests that fiscal consolidation in
terms of reduction in revenue deficit has been more
encouraging in case of state governments. However, our
technical analysis suggests that this improvement has been
achieved to a large extent by the Finance Commission (FC)
awards. Thus, the indicative ceiling on overall transfer to
states on the revenue account is set at 39.5% of gross rev-
enue receipts of the centre on the basis of the recom-
mendation of the Thirteenth FC. Thus, the elimination of
revenue deficit will have implication for state finances in
terms of the tax devolution to states as well as grants-in-aid
to states. For example, the share of grants in the total
transfer has come down from 18.9% to 15.1% from the
Twelfth to Thirteenth FC.
Ritvik Pandey: While the state debt was relatively
steady at around 20e22% of GDP till the year 1997e98, it
started increasing sharply after that. The fiscal deficit also
remained below 3% of GDP till 1997e98, but increased to
4.5% by 1999e2000. One main reason for this sharp increase
was implementation of Fifth Pay Commission report by the
states and poor revenue performance by the states. By the
end of 2003e04, the debt levels touched almost 32% of GDP.
To give a historical perspective, the debt to GDP ratio in
1971e72 was 20% compared to 4% in 1951e52. It came down
to 18% by 1983e84 and increased to 20% percent by
1988e89. Therefore, the debt stress witnessed by the
states during the first few years of this century was un-
precedented and took its toll on delivery of public services.
The states found it difficult to even pay salaries and
repeatedly faced cash crunch. The debt of the state has to
be approved by the central government. This had been the
primary source of control over the state debt till the 12th
FC recommended that states legislate their FRBM Acts. The
12th FC also mandated states to chalk out a debt consoli-
dation roadmap in accordance with broad targets recom-
mended by it. Later, the 13th FC refined the debt
consolidation roadmap and gave a formula for determining
the borrowing ceiling of a state by the centre. Normally,
the overall borrowing ceiling is decided by the formula
given by the 13th FC and then using a projected amount of
inflows from other sources, the amount to be raised through
Market Borrowings is determined based on which the RBI
draws a borrowing calendar. Experience has shown that the
debt and deficit levels prescribed by the successive FCs,
which now form part of the FRBM Acts of the states have
worked well. It is not an easy job to fix an exactly optimally
sustainable debt level. However, from a practical view-
point, a good benchmark is one that is acceptable,implementable, and maintains the balance between
affordability and the development needs of the govern-
ment. To this effect, the current ceilings have passed the
test of time.
CS: What has been the impact of low buoyancy of cen-
tral transfers and spillover of central pay revisions on state
finances?
Peeyush Kumar: The transfer of funds from the centre
to the states has been increasing on two counts. One,
successive FCs have been increasing the state’s share of
devolution, and the centre has been increasing the plan
scheme allocations both under the centrally sponsored
schemes and central assistance to States. As a result of
increasing devolution from the centre, state finances have
shown marked improvement. With development functions
being largely taken care by the funds from the centre,
states have not only adhered to their respective fiscal tar-
gets but to a large extent achieved surplus on revenue
account, despite pay revisions.
Ritvik Pandey: State finances have seen many cycles of
ups and downs since independence and states have adopted
different strategies to cope with the financial challenges
that they faced from time to time. The states’ capacity to
deal with the challenges differs widely. While some states
are largely self-reliant, others heavily rely on central
financial assistance. While some face resource disability
due to structural issues, others have been facing problems
due to poor fiscal management over long term. Similarly,
the cost disabilities faced by each state also differs. These
disparities have led to each state being in a different status
when it comes to debt and deficit management. While the
state finances have been primarily guided by factors such as
composition of economy, demography, social development,
and geography, there even have been certain one-off
events that have had lasting or even permanent impact
on a few states. For example, terrorism in Punjab has had
almost a permanent impact on the debt levels that the
state has been into. There are certain events that have
impacted the debt levels of all states but have had
different impact on different states depending on their
fiscal capacity, such as in the case of pay commissions.
Overall, states have evolved their own strategies for debt
and deficit management depending on their strengths and
challenges. However, there has been some uniformity in
their approaches, especially recently, mainly due to the
overall legal framework, role of the centre and other cen-
tral bodies like the RBI and the approach followed by the
central finance commissions.
CS: The FRBM guidelines necessitate significant reduc-
tion in fiscal deficit, which may eventually affect govern-
ment expenditure on the social sector. In this regard, to
what extent will the FRBM Act be feasible for an emerging
country like India?
Peeyush Kumar: Fiscal responsibility and budget man-
agement is the mechanism of legislative control over debt.
It is not only desirable but also essential in a parliamentary
system to have such a control on one of the most important
parameters of fiscal policy. The constitutional provisions of
budgetary control provide for expenditure control but since
there is no direct control on revenues, deficit is incidental
rather than a principal policy instrument. Fiscal re-
sponsibility and budget management brings back the focus
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borrowing upfront. In this sense, FRBM changes the orien-
tation of fiscal policy. Since the turn of this century, it has
become the mainstay of fiscal policy both at the centre and
state level. In emerging countries like India there is a def-
inite need to provide for welfare and social sectors to cater
to the vulnerable sections. However, it is also incumbent on
the government to provide the right policy direction to
growth to meet the growing aspirations of the nation.
Governments have to be responsible enough to provide
impetus to growth, which in turn allows access to more
resources for welfare measures. There is a fine balance
between the competing demands, and FRBM enjoins the
government to follow a prudent debt and fiscal policy.
R. K. Pattnaik: The preamble to the FRBM Act 2003
states that it is: “An Act to provide for the responsibility of
the central government to ensure inter-generational equity
in fiscal management and long term macro-economic sta-
bility by achieving sufficient revenue surplus and removing
fiscal impediments in the effective conduct of monetary
policy and prudential debt management consistent with
fiscal sustainability through limits on the central govern-
ment borrowings, debt and deficits, greater transparency in
fiscal operations of the central government and conducting
fiscal policy in a medium-term framework and for matters
connected therewith or incidental thereto”. Fiscal re-
sponsibility and budget management is based on the above
objectives. Therefore, in the long run it is growth and social
sector supportive. The fiscal consolidation through FRBM
should emphasize the four Fs of fiscal empowerment
(maximize revenue to the budget), fiscal transparency
(avoidance of any creative accounting), fiscal marksman-
ship (maintaining budget integrity avoiding large deviation
in the budget estimates, revised estimates and accounts
figures) and fiscal space (counter cyclical policies to
manage the fluctuations in business environment due to
exogenous shocks). If these four wheels are strong the fiscal
sector cart will have a smooth run.
Ritvik Pandey: Reduction of deficit does not necessarily
mean reduction in expenditure. In fact, in India fiscal re-
forms have been mainly revenue led. Governments at both
levels realized that the revenue realization has been at a
sub-optimal level and embarked upon ambitious revenue
reforms, many of which were targetted towards fixing tax
administration. Expenditure reforms in India are yet to take
off full steam. Impact of some of the reforms like the shift
to a contributory pension scheme will be visible only after a
decade or so. Social sector spending should only be the last
casualty of fiscal reforms since many other opportunities
exist.
CS: What are your views on the introduction of the
concept of effective revenue deficit in fiscal calculus?
R. K. Pattnaik: In my considered view, introduction of
effective revenue deficit (ERD) is a classic case of creative
accounting and is against any norm of fiscal prudence. What
are the advantages of ERD? The union budget makes a
distinction in functional expenditure categories. Capital
grants should not be part of revenue expenditure as it is
meant for creating capital assets. What are the disadvan-
tages of ERD? It is against the constitutional provisions of
budget making. Annual financial statement (AFS) presented
to the parliament according to Article 112 of the Constitutiontreats all grants as revenue expenditure. Effective revenue
deficit suffers from time inconsistency. This was introduced
as the GOI realized that elimination of revenue deficit (RD)
looks difficult within a span of five years. Fiscal transparency
suggests that sudden shocks to accounting arrangements
should best be avoided.What are the net implications for the
general government finances with ERD? Since grants,
whether capital in nature or otherwise, are treated as non-
tax revenue receipts, these are in AFS of state govern-
ments meant to finance revenue expenditure. To the extent
the central government reduces its RD and if these are not
treated as revenue receipts of states, the RD of states goes
up by similar amount of reduction and has no impact in the
general government RD. Since RD is not eliminated, there are
macro-economic implications in terms of savings and
growth, and the vicious cycle of deficit and debt! Should we
abandon the concept of ERD? In the interest of constitutional
budgetary accounting coupled with adverse macro-
economic implications for savings and growth, the concept
of ERD may be revisited and could be dispensed with.
Vijay Singh Chauhan: Deficit is an important indicator of
the health of the economy and different measures are
intended to highlight different perspectives with which
government deficit can be looked at. The GOI plays an
important role of a financial intermediary, a role which has
been declining over time for a variety of reasons. Thus,
loans as an expenditure item have been going down. Sig-
nificant changes in accounting practices, most important of
which is in relation to small savings towards the end of the
last millennium, also resulted in the decline in capital
expenditure of the government. Effective revenue deficit
seeks to address some such concerns.
Peeyush Kumar: The first version of FRBM, which was
enacted in 2003 required elimination of RD while limiting
the fiscal space. However, it was soon realized that there
are certain problems in this approach essentially due to the
federal nature of our financial system. As per accounting
standards, all transfer payments are treated as revenue
even when the amount is used for creation of capital assets.
In other words, elimination of RD meant severe restrictions
on the centre’s ability to borrow resources even for capital
spending in the states. This required the centre to deploy
only balance from current revenues for development pur-
poses which was greatly constrained due to other compel-
ling demands. It was felt that the FRBM regime was too
restrictive and needs to be rationalized. Thus, in the new
FRBM regime, the concept of ERD has been introduced
defined as difference between the RD and grant-in-aid for
creation of capital assets (GIA Capex). By limiting RD below
2% and setting the goal for elimination of the ERD, the new
version of FRBM provides for scope of mobilizing additional
resources which can be exclusively set aside for the crea-
tion of capital assets in the field. Given the federal nature
of government structure and accounting treatment of
transfer payments, ERD is a novel approach to allow bor-
rowings for capital use. It addresses the quality of govern-
ment spending while keeping quantitative tap on borrowing
levels.
Ritvik Pandey: The concept of ERD is the least under-
stood concept and has been attracting unnecessary criti-
cism. It has been widely acknowledged that the fiscal
reform strategy should consist of twin efforts of reducing
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the first focusses on the quantity of debt, the second
focusses on the quality aspect, that is, do not incur revenue
expenditure out of borrowed funds but only create assets
out of borrowed funds. If we accept this as a viable and
desirable strategy, the problem at hand is the distortion
associated with the revenue deficit, especially given the
peculiar nature of the fiscal federal structure that involves
a large amount of fiscal transfers. In the current context,
grants for a scheme like Pradhan Mantri Gram Sadak Yojana
(PMGSY) are classified as revenue expenditure although it
leads to creation of assets in the economy. Similar is the
status of Accelerated Irrigation Benefit Programme and
many other such programmes.
If RD has to be reduced, outlays under these schemes
also have to be reduced, which defeats the purpose as the
purpose is to divert more resources towards capital
expenditure. Therefore it is desirable to devise a param-
eter that excludes these kinds of expenditure and target
elimination of that parameter. The argument made in
response is that the asset so created does not ‘belong’ to
the central government. This is an extremely misplaced
notion as the assets created by any level of government
‘belongs’ to all levels of government. The returns on gov-
ernment’s investments come in the form of higher eco-
nomic growth and therefore higher revenues. To that
effect, it is irrelevant which level of government builds
roads or dams, it will eventually have the same effect on
industrial or agricultural growth. The question of imple-
mentation should be left to considerations of efficiency. It
is better if the central government builds rails, state gov-
ernments build state highways and panchayats implement
PMGSY, but the impact of all these on the economy would
be the same. If the central government itself would have
implemented PMGSY, it would have been out of the RD
definition and just because it transfers that money to
panchayats, it gets included in the RD. Therefore, to meet
the requirement of ‘create assets out of borrowed funds’, it
is better to devise a parameter that is independent of the
‘implementation question’. This purpose is served by the
ERD.
Contrary to what is claimed by many people, ERD is
hardly an accounting parameter. It is more of an economic
concept. While this correction may not be relevant for
countries that have occasional fiscal federal transfers, it is
extremely critical for a country like India where federal
transfers are substantial and are of all types. It makes the
parameter more focussed. While some more distortions in
the RD may still exist, it is at least one less.
CS: The Financial Sector Legislative Reforms Commis-
sion (FSLRC) Report recommends setting up of an inde-
pendent debt management agency. Do you think the draft
“code” in its present form will ensure the desired
independence?
K Kanagasabapathy: While the report of the Commission
in its first volume recommends an independent debt man-
agement agency, the draft code presented in the second
volume does not reflect either in spirit or letter the
intention of the Commission in its first volume. The FSLRC
envisages an independent public debt management agency
(DMA) combined with a specialized framework on public
debt management. The draft code is intended to create aspecialised statutory public debt management agency that
is equipped to manage the liabilities of the government in a
holistic manner. This agency is expected to have indepen-
dent goals and objectives e but as an agent of the central
government. The DMO is to be guided by an advisory council
and run by a management committee with representation
from the RBI and the central government. The principles of
governance, including transparency and accountability, will
apply to all functions of the agency, its committee and
council. The draft code however deprives both manage-
ment committee and the advisory council of any indepen-
dent functioning. The DMA will function under the overall
superintendence of the finance ministry and will have to
necessarily follow the instructions of the central govern-
ment. Thus, the DMA has been made subservient to the
ministry and will not enjoy any independence. In the pro-
posed arrangement, there is potential for the ministry to
interfere in the day to day functioning of the DMA. The
existing arrangement where the RBI performs the debt
management function seems to be more independent than
the proposed DMA.
Peeyush Kumar: As stated above, ‘independent’ debt
management is a misnomer. By definition debt policy is
intimately linked to, in fact is part of, the fiscal policy.
There can be various legislative controls on the policy but it
cannot be conceptually independent. The debt functions
are an integral part of the government functions. Thus,
there are examples of government, and through it the
treasury department, directly discharging the debt func-
tions or through an attached office. Alternately, in some
countries including India, the central bank performs this
function. Independence here refers to the operational
aspect of the debt management, rather than the policy
part, which needs some expertise. Since such expertise is
difficult to develop in the ministries the preferred option is
either through the central bank or an attached office with
independence in market operations. Such independence is
there under the existing system with the RBI and has been
sufficiently built into the proposed system.
CS: This brings us to the close of our round table dis-
cussion. There are a number of issues involved in separating
debt from monetary management. In the initial years, it
was the RBI which was suggesting that the separation would
be helpful in policy making but in recent years, probably
because of the financial crisis of 2008 the RBI does not
consider the separation as appropriate. In the literature
and as per the empirical literature, many countries have
separated debt from monetary management to pursue
focussed objectives of debt and monetary management
separately. The separation will help the interest rates to be
market determined, as well as force the government to
expand investor base to mobilise additional resources to
meet the ever expanding demand from the rising fiscal
deficits.
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